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I SPEAK FOR THE CHINESE

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# I SPEAK FOR THE CHINESE

by  
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## PREFACE

IN carrying out her programme of encroachment on China, Japan has always timed her moves so that they would attract the least possible attention. The famous 'Twenty-one Demands' were presented when the eyes of the world were on the death struggle in Europe. In the few brief periods of calm which followed the conclusion of the Versailles Peace Treaty, Japan was inactive, but with each of the many periods when the world was distraught with other matters, she has, as furtively as possible, pushed ahead with her programme. While indignantly denying that she has any but high-minded aims, she has pursued the most devious and secretive tactics in their accomplishment.

It is for this reason that the story of her felonious infringements on China is not well known to the general public. Some incidents have been remembered, but others forgotten. But they all fit together in a logical

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sequence and tell one consistent story of military aggression which has hesitated at nothing to accomplish its purposes. That is the story which this volume tells very briefly. It does not contain a single statement which has not been authenticated from many sources. In order to avoid burdening the text with footnotes, a fairly complete bibliography will be found in the appendix.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to my friends, T. O. Thackrey, Miles W. Vaughan, and Bruno Schwartz, who have been of great help to me in checking dates.

CARL CROW.

## CHRONOLOGY

- 1853 Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan resulted in promise to open Japanese ports to foreign trade.
- 1854 Townsend Harris negotiated treaty between Japan and America.
- 1874 Japanese expedition against Formosa, a Chinese possession.
- 1894-5 War between China and Japan, resulting in Japan's acquisition of Formosa and establishment of the independence of Korea.
- 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War. Japan acquired Russian rights in Manchuria, but was compelled by the powers to give up part of them.
- 1905 Japanese treaty with Great Britain guaranteed the independence and integrity of China.
- 1910 Japan formally annexed Korea.
- 1911 Oct. 10. Republican revolution in China started.
- 1911 Dec. 23. Japanese Minister at Peking announced that Japan would never recognise a Chinese republic.
- 1912 Jan. 1. Sun Yat-Sen inaugurated as provisional President of the Republic of China.

## CHRONOLOGY

- 1914 Aug. 23. Japan declared war on Germany and seized the German-leased territory of Kiaochow in Shantung.
- 1915 May 7. Japanese presented Twenty-one Demands to China.
- 1919 Versailles Peace Conference confirmed Japan's acquisition of German rights in Shantung. Japan joined the League of Nations.
- 1922 Japan signed the Nine Power Treaty guaranteeing to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of China.
- 1924 Nov. 5. 'Mr. Henry Pu Yi,' former emperor of China, took refuge in Japanese Legation in Peking, and later put himself under Japanese protection in Japanese concession of Tientsin.
- 1924 Dec. Japanese aid enabled Chang Tso-Lin to establish himself as war lord of Manchuria.
- 1927 April. Japanese troops prevented march of Chiang Kai-Shek on Peking.
- 1928 May. Japanese troops seized the Kiaochow railway, the city of Tsinan, and part of the Tientsin-Pukow railway.
- 1928 June. Chang Tso-Lin, who had flouted Japanese advice, was killed by a bomb under mysterious circumstances.
- 1928 Aug. Japan signed the Pact of Paris.
- 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria.

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- 1932 Jan. Japan's undeclared war on Shanghai.
- 1932 Former emperor of China established as emperor of new state of Manchukuo under Japanese protection.
- 1933 Chinese province of Jehol cut off from China and made a part of Manchukuo.
- 1933 Assembly of the League of Nations condemned Japan's invasion of Manchuria as a result of the findings of the Lytton Commission.
- 1937 July. Japanese forces invaded North China.
- 1937 Aug. Japanese forces attacked Shanghai.



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AT the outbreak of the World War in 1914 I was living in Tokyo, where I was business manager of the *Japan Advertiser*, a well-known American-owned daily paper. I was also acting as correspondent of the United Press, an organisation which I had previously represented in China, where I covered the outbreak of the Republican Revolution and the downfall of the 300-year-old Manchu dynasty. My duties as correspondent in Tokyo were very light, for the War in Europe dominated all the news columns, and after Japan played her brief part in the War by the capture of the German-controlled Chinese port of Tsing-tao there was not for several months news in Japan of sufficient importance to justify cable tolls. The entire Far East was forgotten while world attention was centred on Europe. But while the world forgot the Far East, events were moving there which would precipitate another



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war and create a situation as perilous to the peace of the world as the War then being fought in Europe.

By one of those lucky chances which sometimes fall to the lot of a newspaper man I learned about these events in a very curious and dramatic way.

On May 8, 1915, I received a telephone call stating that the Russian ambassador to Japan wanted to see me personally about his subscription to the *Japan Advertiser*, and asking that I call on him at three o'clock that afternoon. It struck me at the time as curious that the ambassador of one of the great powers should want a personal interview with the business manager of a newspaper about such an unimportant matter as a newspaper subscription, but in a capital like Tokyo no one treats lightly a call from an ambassador, so I was at the Embassy at the hour he had named. As I recall it, the building was one of the finest in Tokyo, typical of the old Imperial Russia, whose foundations had not yet been shaken by the revolution.

As soon as I sent in my card, one of the Embassy secretaries came out and, explaining

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that the ambassador would receive me in a few minutes, asked me to wait in a small study off the main hall. He ushered me into the room and then went out, closing the door behind him. The room, for a study, was rather large; the one conspicuous piece of furniture was a library table with a single chair. There were other chairs in the room, but they were all pushed against the walls. Obviously the place intended for me was the chair facing the table. As I seated myself here to wait for the ambassador, my eyes fell on a sheet of paper, the only thing on the table. It was a large white sheet, covered with a typewritten message, and I could no more avoid reading the first lines than I could help seeing the paper. In capital letters the message began:

### THE FOLLOWING 21 DEMANDS WERE PRESENTED YESTERDAY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA

I did not at the time bother to read the details of the document. I had not been

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a correspondent in the Far East for several years without learning that diplomats are not such careless people as to leave state papers about for prying newspaper men to read unless there is some reason. I folded the document and put it in my pocket. A few minutes later the ambassador came in, gave me instructions about changing the address of his paper, and escorted me to the door. So far as he and I were concerned, the incident was closed.

As soon as I returned to the office I read the document, and before I was half-way through I realised that here was a piece of news that would crowd the European War off the front pages. The demands presented by Japan to the weak and corrupt government of China amounted in effect to the establishment of a protectorate which would lead, by easy steps, to the complete domination of China by Japan. Already the map of Europe was being changed in a way not yet fully determined. China's acceptance of Japan's demands would, by what might be called a diplomatic journal entry, change the map of Asia and change also the political

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status of the most populous country on the globe. The ultimatum presented to Serbia by Germany, which had led to the War in Europe only a few months earlier, was trivial and unimportant in comparison.

My call at the Embassy was the realisation of a newspaper man's dream. A sensational world scoop! And an exclusive one. For before I left the Russian Embassy one of the secretaries informed me significantly that I was the only caller the ambassador had received that day, a remark which I interpreted to mean that I was the only one who had received confidences. I never learned why I was so honoured, but I respected the obligation placed upon me and in writing these lines I am disclosing for the first time the source from which I received the story. At this late date it can do no harm to make known the fact that the Russian secret service, by some means secured an important secret document from Japan, and attempted to give it publicity through an American newspaper correspondent.

It was the realisation of a dream, but there was a nightmare in the background. I knew

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that it was absolutely impossible to cable the news from Japan, that any reference to the matter was sure to be caught by the Japanese censors. So I did the next best thing. I mailed a copy of the document to a friend in Shanghai with a request that he cable it to New York, and I mailed one copy to each of five friends who were employed by the United Press of America. The Shanghai letter was never delivered. Of the five letters addressed to personal friends, only one reached its destination. But that one enabled the United Press to be the first to present the complete text of the document. The story had already leaked out from Peking but in incomplete form, as the Japanese had threatened the Peking officials with dire punishment if they gave out the text, or even revealed the fact that an ultimatum of any kind had been presented.

Japan precipitated this Far Eastern crisis at a time when the Allies were beginning to feel the force of German guns and America, though a neutral, was having the War brought very close to her. On May 1, at

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the beginning of the summer travel season, the German Embassy at Washington issued a formal warning to Americans advising them not to travel to Europe. Three days later a dispatch from Vienna told of Austro-German successes in Galicia and a general retreat of the Russian army, which had advanced into Hungary. This was confirmed by dispatches from Petrograd. Russians officially admitting that the Austrians had reached the Russian second line of defence. On the same day people the world over shuddered at a new terror of war, for Sir John French announced that the Germans were using asphyxiating gas.

Obviously the world had many things to think about besides political trouble in the Orient. And Japan very wisely chose this time to establish herself in China – when the European powers who had interests there were too absorbed in more important matters close at home to offer serious interference. It appeared for the moment that the fates were actually siding with the aggressor, for on the day the demands were submitted, the S.S. *Lusitania* was torpedoed and sunk

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near the Irish coast, with the loss of more than a thousand lives, including 114 Americans.

Although there were twenty-one separate demands, they were divided into five groups. The first two groups were to the effect that China formally recognise Japan's 'rights' in Shantung, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia. The Shantung 'rights' had been acquired by Japan's capture of the German naval base at Tsing-tao, but Japan had assumed possession of a great deal more than the Germans had surrendered – she had assumed a protectorate over the whole of Shantung province, with garrisons located at all strategic points. This was particularly exasperating to the Chinese because Shantung was the birth-place of the two great sages, Confucius and Mencius, and was looked on as a kind of Chinese 'Holy Land'. Southern Manchuria had been a prize of the Russo-Japanese war, but the lease, as originally forced on China by Russia, was now about to expire; Japan demanded that it be extended for a period of ninety-nine years, and that further rights and privileges be granted. Some of these

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additional privileges would have meant an encroachment on the rights of Russia, one of the Allies. The clauses regarding Inner Mongolia had even less justification than the others in this group, for they were based on nothing more ethical or tangible than Japanese intrigues with Inner Mongolian princes who wished to throw off Chinese sovereignty and had found ready help and encouragement from Japan.

The third group had to do with the Han Yeh Ping Co., an important iron mining and smelting concern which had been established by Li Hung-Chang with Chinese capital and in which Japan had acquired an interest. It was then, as it is now, the most important industrial establishment in China, providing the principal supply of iron and steel. The arsenal which was a part of the plant was the largest in the country. Japan proposed to take this great plant under complete control.

The fourth group of demands involved the lease to Japan of harbours along the coast of Fukien Province and required that China lease no other harbours and bays in any part



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of the country without the consent of Japan. Fukien Province lies across a narrow strait from Formosa, which Japan took from China in the Sino-Japanese war; the establishment of a naval base so near to this heavily-fortified island would enable Japan to threaten all of South-eastern China and dominate the mouth of the Yangtze.

Acceptance of the first four groups would have deprived China of a very large part of her sovereignty, but they were mild as compared with the fifth group, which proposed to leave her in about the same position as Corea or Formosa. China, in order to consolidate and secure Japan's ambitions as expressed in the first four groups, was to entrust the training of her army and navy to Japanese military and naval officials, and employ Japanese experts for the reorganisation of her finances. This would have the effect of placing the armed forces of the country, as well as its financial resources, in the hands of Japan; it would make China virtually her slave. Although the Japanese military, naval, and financial experts were termed 'advisers', they would be the official ap-

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pointees of the Japanese government, and their advice would carry the weight of commands backed up by armed force.

Having outlined a programme which would give her physical control of China, Japan next turned to cultural matters. China was to allow Japan to open schools in all parts of the country for the teaching of the Japanese language. The method of financing these schools was left open; but the presumption was that China would pay for them and that eventually the whole educational system of the country would become Japanese, and Japanese the official language. Furthermore Japan was to be allowed to send missionaries to China – a curious demand which the Chinese thought must have some strange ulterior motive, as Japan had received her Buddhist religion from China as well as her religious superstitions. The truth was that the only religion she had to propagate with which the Chinese were not already familiar was the worship of the Mikado. Since China only a few years before this had been, in theory rather than in fact, worshipping the Manchu Son of

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Heaven in Peking, doubtless the Japanese had dreams of transferring this worship to the Japanese Son of Heaven in Tokyo, thus binding the Chinese people by a political religion as well as by force.

The final demand in this group of five was quite obviously an afterthought and was designed to perpetuate Japan's control of Fukien Province. It provided that China was first to consult with and secure the consent of Japan before entering into any agreement with another power for making loans for the building of railways or the construction of harbour works in Fukien.

The presentation of these demands came as a sequel to Japan's defeat of the German forces at Tsing-tao, because Yuan Shih-Kai, who as President of the Republic of China, was the virtual dictator of the country, had protested Japan's assumption of rights which had never been claimed by Germany. Doubtless an element of personal animosity of long standing played a considerable part. Yuan Shih-Kai had held an important official position in the Chinese government in Corea when Japanese aggressions in that country

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precipitated the Sino-Japanese war. After Japan's easy victory he was entrusted by the Manchu court with the task of building up the Chinese army, and this he did so successfully that he aroused the antagonism of the Japanese war lords. They were quite openly pleased when a Manchu palace intrigue sent Yuan Shih-Kai into retirement, and as openly suspicious and resentful when a turn of the political wheel brought him to power again. Yuan Shih-Kai, on the other hand, thanks to his Corean experience, was familiar with Japanese methods of intrigue and was thoroughly wary of them.

As soon as news of the demands leaked out Japanese diplomats in all the important capitals issued reassuring statements or outright denials. To do them justice, the diplomats themselves were not fully informed, for the military party was then dominant in Japan and the party heads rarely bothered either to secure the advice of the diplomats or to instruct them when a course of action had been decided upon. Without investigating the matter further or waiting for the official reports from the

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American minister at Peking, William Jennings Bryan – then Secretary of State – accepted at face value a statement by the Japanese ambassador; and he, in turn, gave out an official statement expressing the belief of the American government that Japan did not mean to harm the integrity of China nor disturb relations between China and other nations. At the time he had not even seen a copy of the document which Japan had handed to China.

Other statesmen were not so gullible, nor was the general public. As soon as the sinister designs of Japan became known, and in spite of the fact that attention was centred on Europe, there was a general outcry at the bad faith that would prompt a nation to take advantage of the death struggle of her allies. The world had not then become so callous as it is at present.

Officials of the weak Peking government, frightened by Japanese threats and corrupted by Japanese bribes, were willing to comply with the demands and actually did accept them verbally within forty-eight hours after they were presented. Whether this accept-

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ance was actually by the Chinese government or by only a group of officials has never been clear, but the action served to throw the blame on China rather than on Japan. By giving in to Japan China was violating treaties she had made with America and other powers just as surely as Japan had violated her treaties in submitting the demands. This gave the diplomats a convenient angle from which to attack the problem, for it enabled them to belabour China instead of Japan and thus accomplish their purpose without openly affronting a powerful ally. Diplomatic pressure was consequently brought to bear in many quarters, and when an agreement was finally reached between the two countries, only seven of the original demands had been included.

The dangerous fifth group which would have given Japan control of China's army, navy, and finances was thrown out entirely. Instead of agreeing to lease parts in Fukien Province to Japan, China pledged herself not to lease them to a third country. Other items were toned down or modified – not, it must be admitted, in the interests of China,

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but to safeguard the interests of foreign powers.

In this way the crisis was passed, but it is important to remember that Japan did not withdraw any of her stipulations, and that the twenty-one demands have, with occasional alterations and adjustments, remained the text-book and formula of Japan's policy in China. They were conveniently pigeon-holed where they would not attract public attention – that was all; they could be drawn out at a moment's notice when the time seemed opportune.

To make a brief excursion into history, Japan's ambition to dominate China was inspired by her easy victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5. For some years afterwards it appeared that she would be able to accomplish her end without resort to arms. Palace intrigues and bribery of the weak Manchu princes were cheaper and easier than war. But these plans were upset by the unexpected success of the Republican Revolution of 1911, the downfall of the Manchus early in the following year, and

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the establishment of the so-called Republican Government of China.

This sudden and unforeseen development made it necessary for Japan to readjust her programme for the domination of her continental neighbour. The greedy and easily-corrupted Manchu princes had been replaced by the equally greedy and corrupt war lords, who held various parts of China in their hands as they carried on intrigues and fought among themselves for sovereignty over the entire country. All were avaricious for personal gain, and while they taxed the people to the point of starvation they kept as much of the money as possible in their own pockets and did not pay their troops. It sounds fantastic, but it is a fact that at one time the land taxes in certain parts of Szechuen Province were paid for forty years in advance. This was a political situation which just suited the Japanese genius for espionage and intrigue. Almost every war lord was surrounded by a crowd of Japanese who not only advised him on political and military affairs, but lent him money and arranged for the purchase of arms on



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convenient terms. These advisers were political agents who from time to time secured from the war lords promises and agreements, which would strengthen Japan's position in China. Acceptance of the twenty-one demands would have consolidated all of these gains and secured others. For reasons already explained, Japan's coup was only partially successful, and she was left with only a fraction of what she had hoped for. On the other hand, the fact that the government headed by Yuan Shih-Kai had given in to Japan at all aroused bitter resentment everywhere, and the fall of his government, which was anticipated by his rather mysterious death, again threw China into the utmost confusion.

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It was not long, however, before Japan had adapted her policy to fit the new conditions. The continuation of the World War with its ever-widening theatre, and the state of near-anarchy which existed in China, provided what appeared to be a heaven-sent opportunity. Her allies, backed by neutral America, had protested against the twenty-one

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demands as constituting an infringement of their treaty rights in China, but by an adroit change of policy it might be possible to place Allies and neutrals alike in a position where they would have no reason to protest. With America's entry into the War Japan's opportunities were bettered. World attention was more than ever concentrated on Europe, and, whether they liked it or not, and no matter how much they suspected her good faith, the Allies were compelled to leave their Oriental interests in the hands of Japan. These interests were mainly in China, where Great Britain and America especially had very large investments and many nationals. To a lesser degree all the other Allies and neutrals were interested in the maintenance of peace in China simply because peace was better for their business.

What Japan needed was a pretext which would justify her in the occupation of the country for the purpose of restoring peace and order. If a situation developed requiring that she send her troops into China to protect the property and lives of British, French and American nationals, she would

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be able to meet her allies at the peace conference with a pretty good case. There was always the chance that there might be another uprising like that of the Boxers when the lives of all foreigners would be endangered and Japan would be the only power which could offer protection. By playing her cards astutely she might even be able to place the Allies under obligation to her. They might suspect her motives, but they would be in no position to question them. In the event of a German victory Japan would be more advantageously situated than ever, for she would have but one victor to deal with instead of a half-dozen.

In order to accomplish this programme it was necessary to act before the end of the Great War, when, no matter what the outcome, foreign battleships would be free to return to the ports of China and provide protection for their nationals.

It appeared at that time that China was verging on a state of complete anarchy, but the process of disintegration was not rapid enough for Japan's purposes and she set about speeding up events in every possible

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way. The number of Japanese advisers attached to the courts of the various feudalistic war lords was greatly increased. Loans for the purchase of munitions became more reckless; from mysterious sources money and munitions were supplied. Every war lord who was important enough to be considered in the picture was encouraged in attacks on other war lords. Mongolian tribes were incited to set up independent governments, defy the Chinese authorities, and make forays on their prosperous Chinese neighbours. Even the bandits were not overlooked, but were urged on to ravage the country. Every important bandit chieftain in need of funds found at his elbow a Japanese agent ready to supply them – and on very easy terms. And many a bandit chieftain was inspired to new ambitions by the story of Chang Tso-Lin, the great war lord of Manchuria, who had started his career as a rather humble bandit and risen to supreme power through Japanese help. In brief, nothing that would promote a state of anarchy in China was too trivial for the attention of the Japanese plotters.

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When America joined the Allies, I returned to China to act as the Far Eastern representative of the Committee on Public Information, the American war propaganda organisation, in this capacity divided my time between the American Consulate-General in Shanghai and the American Legation in Peking. My official work was purely that of propaganda, but I was in almost daily contact with legation and consular officials, enjoyed their confidence, and so came to know a great many state secrets. However, everyone in China knew the game the Japanese were playing, and what I learned from official sources only confirmed what I already knew. I am not betraying any diplomatic confidences when I say that a very large part of the work of American officials at our legation consisted in checking up on the activities of the Japanese in China and attempting to circumvent their plots. Other Allied powers were engaged in similar work. This was the war as fought on the Chinese front. Victory over Germany was a matter of supreme importance, but, in the meantime,

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there was imminent danger that China with its rich potential markets would fall into the hands of Japan, that the Allied gains in Europe would only be offset by losses in the Orient.

Although the Japanese were fighting with us in the War against Germany, they hampered my work – as they did the work of other American officials – in every possible way. Their interference was petty but very irritating. Through the American navy wireless I received each day in Shanghai a summary of the day's War news, and this we translated and supplied to the Chinese newspapers. The Japanese military authorities picked up these messages at Tsinanfu and sent out garbled versions in which American victories were either ignored or minimised. It was an essential part of Japanese propaganda to convince the Chinese that the Japanese army was superior to all others, and that American military strength was particularly ineffective. America has for many reasons been regarded by the Chinese as their best friend; and many believed that this country could be depended

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upon to come to China's defence in the event of trouble. Japanese propaganda undertook to destroy these hopes by picturing America as a country too weak to offer any substantial resistance against the powerful military machine of Japan. Throughout the War the newspapers published in Tokyo and Osaka provided very curious reading, for there were many stories of American defeats which were not recorded elsewhere because they never occurred.

It was well known to all of us who lived in the Far East that, though Japan was an Ally, Japanese generally were hoping for a German victory. Japan had been compelled to come into the War because of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but the War was distasteful to the military clan and unpopular with the public. A few days after Japan declared war on Germany an unruly mob in Yokohama tore the British flag from an office building and trampled it in the mud. I mention this minor incident only because it was typical of Japanese sentiment. There were a few similar inci-

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dents later, and doubtless would have been a great many more but for the careful surveillance of the Japanese police. Throughout the War the newspapers exulted in German victories.

Several things account for this popular point of view. The Japanese state as reconstructed from its feudal framework after the peaceful invasion of Commodore Perry was built on a German model. In fact, Prince Ito wrote the constitution of Japan while on a visit to Bismarck, and that great German statesman, it has been said, practically dictated the document. The Japanese army was modelled along German lines down to such minor details as the marking of the insignia on the uniforms of the recruits.

In spite of the fact that America had made generous contributions to the education of Japan, and England had raised her status as a world power by reason of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan's affection and admiration were all for Germany.

Not only would a German victory have been popular with the masses in Japan; it



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would have fitted in with the plans of Japanese statesmen who envisaged a triumphant Germany welcoming a partnership with Japan that would give the latter special rights in Asia and leave Germany free to cope with Europe. There were many stories current in the diplomatic set of Peking to the effect that Japan and Germany came to some kind of a secret understanding during the course of the War, but if such an agreement was reached it has never been published. Nevertheless – understanding or no understanding – Japan left the way open for an easy rapprochement with a victorious Germany. She carried out the letter of her obligations under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by driving the German fleet from Tsing-tao, but aside from that she did nothing to arouse German animosities. On the other hand, she did everything possible to retain German friendship. In the whole history of warfare no prisoners were ever so coddled and pampered as the few thousand Germans who were captured at Tsing-tao. They were probably the only prisoners of war who, in addition to being comfortably if not luxuriously

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housed, fed, and clothed, were provided with carefully-selected Japanese prostitutes.

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The Japanese have at all times been very much hurt and surprised to have their official actions so severely criticised in other countries. They claim that they have been misunderstood, and their indignation is quite sincere. In truth, Japan is misunderstood and will continue to be. A great deal of this misunderstanding is due to the fact that we of other countries seek to measure the Japanese by our own moral standards, and by that *criterion their actions are often dishonourable* and wholly indefensible. The Japanese quite naturally resent being judged by a set of rules not their own. While certain individuals, through Christian influence or for some other reason, have adopted what we call the Christian, or Western, code of morals, the Japanese nation as a whole has never made any pretence of accepting the foreign point of view. The Japanese code, while entirely different from our own, is very simple. Although it has been embroidered

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and decorated into an elaborate document, in its practical applications it embraces nothing more than worship of the emperor as a god and the complete dedication of the individual to the perpetuation of his glory. There is a sharp distinction made between the nature of the Japanese emperor and other rulers – for example, the king of England. The latter rules by the grace of God. The Japanese emperor is God himself. This divinity of the emperor has been interpreted in such a way that any act committed by a subject of Japan for the glory of the emperor finds entire justification in the eyes of all his fellow-countrymen. It is for this reason that the political assassins – many of them military men – who have been numerous in recent years, have either gone unpunished or have been dealt with in very kindly fashion. The mere declaration: ‘I did it for the glory of the emperor’ at once disarms criticism and compels approval, no matter how cowardly or shocking the act may be according to the standards of other countries.

Thus, in the bombing of defenceless Chi-

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nese cities and the slaughter of thousands of civilians, the curious Japanese conscience is clear. The slaughter of civilians is justified on two counts. It helps – or Japan hopes that it helps – to destroy the morale of the Chinese people. So far it appears to have failed utterly in the accomplishment of that purpose; it has instead stiffened Chinese resistance. But there can be no doubt about the successful accomplishment of the other objective. The mass murders brutalise the Japanese soldiers, thereby making them better fighters.

Japanese militarists, with their realistic view of things, have come to the conclusion that – since a soldier must receive his baptism of fire before he reaches his highest efficiency – it is much better for him to receive such baptism by attacking defenceless civilians rather than an armed soldiery; there is less risk. Even under the most favourable circumstances, Japanese forces would suffer an occasional casualty in battle. But it is possible to kill civilians with no loss of fighting strength. So this is obviously the better system. Japanese soldiers are thereby trained

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in the necessary technique of war and victory is promoted which will add to the glory of the emperor. No other justification is required.

The same simple code applies to the making and to the violation of treaties. If the glory of the emperor can be advanced by breaking a treaty, then that is the honourable thing to do. If, on the other hand, it would add glory to sign a treaty with no intention of keeping it, then again there can be no question as to the course of action to be followed. It must be taken into consideration further that the *samurai* conceive of their emperor not as a Japanese god, but as a universal god who would rule the world but for the perversity of human nature. If this basic conception of Japanese religion and morality is kept in mind it will explain many things which are otherwise very puzzling.

Naturally, the idea of a god who eats, sleeps, gets sick, and dies just like an ordinary person is fantastic to us. It is even more fantastic when one considers that the emperor-god of Japan is a comparatively new creation.

According to Japanese history, a long line

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of emperors ruled the country for generations. Then as the feudal governments grew stronger and more ambitious and the central government weaker, the Mikado was relegated to the position of a powerless pope, while the *shoguns* – usually in the person of a mighty feudal lord – took over the power. Back of the *shoguns* was the caste known as *samurai*, warrior nobles who recognised only the authority of their local lords, or *daimyos*, and who often engaged in civil war with one another for supremacy. When Japan was thrown open to the world as the result of Commodore Perry's expedition in 1853, it soon became obvious that if the country were to survive and defend itself against foreign aggression, the old feudal government must be replaced by a strong central government. The problem was a difficult one, as it involved surrender by the *daimyos* and the *samurai* of special rights and privileges. It was not until 1868, fifteen years after Perry's visit to Japan, that a solution was finally effected which in theory deprived the *samurai* of their privileges but actually made them more secure.

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At this time the Mikado, who had been a helpless exile in Kyoto, was brought to the capital at Tokyo and solemnly restored to the power which had been wrested from his ancestors. He then promulgated a constitution in which there was a clause providing that the Cabinet posts of Minister of War and Minister of the Navy could only be held by generals or admirals – that is, by members of the *samurai* class. Those ministers were also to have the tremendous political advantage of direct access to the emperor, to whom they could appeal without the consent or knowledge of their ministerial colleagues. With these two essential posts assigned exclusively to the *samurai* every premier was at the mercy of this caste. Or, to put it in blunt language which will be bitterly resented by every Japanese, the emperor became a puppet, with the strings pulled by the military clique. Exercising as it did the theoretical power of the emperor, the clique naturally did everything possible to augment that power. The military statesmen have constituted themselves guardians of the throne and interpreters of Japanese morals.

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The whole episode of the Mikado's restoration sounds like a scene from a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta, but it is well to remember that Japan has always been and still is a kind of Gilbert and Sullivan country in which the *most* unaccountable things happen.

The creators of this emperor-god have never ceased their efforts to uphold his power and prestige, for he has been a highly valuable political asset. It is only through him that the bitter provincial differences which exist under the surface in Japan are submerged and the country finds unity and cohesion. Any attempt to give the functions of the emperor a more reasonable political explanation that would deny their divine authority has always met with the most violent opposition. This was proved less than a year ago when one of the really great statesmen and patriots of the country advanced the theory that the emperor was an organ of the state. He was at once the object of a series of murderous attacks for having put forth a sacrilegious idea.

While they have been careful to build up and strengthen the theory of the power of



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the emperor, the militarists who surround him have been equally careful to see that the actual power remains securely in their own hands. Thus by working for the prestige and glory of a puppet ruler they are adding to that reservoir of influence on which they can draw to carry out their own ambitious plans. The history of the world has provided many examples of imperialists who have gone mad through thirst for power, but it would be difficult to find a situation as tempting to the greedy as that which has, since the turn of the century, confronted the war lords of Japan.

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The Allied victory over the Central Powers, the Versailles Peace Conference, and the formation of the League of Nations came as a series of disappointments and surprises to Japan. Each upset plans for Japanese expansion, which had been settled upon for many years and were only awaiting an opportune moment for execution. A League of Nations which would guarantee the peace of the world and protect weaker nations

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against aggression was the last thing Japan wanted, for her policy was one of aggression. But the sentiment of the world was all for peace. Consequently Japan's best policy – in fact, the only policy open to her – was to appear to fall in line, gain the goodwill of the other powers, and wait for a more favourable opportunity to carry out her designs on China. Any other course of action would place her in an isolated position for which she was not yet ready.

In the years that followed, a number of other agreements – such as the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the Nine Power Treaty, and the Naval Limitation Treaty – were entered into, Japan in each case being a signatory. Although these treaties were worded in general terms and were designed in a comprehensive way to guarantee the peace of the world, they were all privately designed to protect China against the aggressions of Japan. No one knew this better than the Japanese themselves and the treaties consequently aroused bitter resentment which they had difficulty in concealing. But they signed because there was nothing else they could do. To decline

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would have advertised their intentions to the world. By affixing their signature to these treaties, the Japanese solemnly pledged themselves to respect the territorial integrity of China.

Perhaps they thought that by signing the agreements they would allay the suspicions of the Chinese, but the Chinese themselves are past masters at Oriental indirection, and I doubt that the Japanese pledges fooled them for a moment. As long ago as the sixth century before Christ the various princes who ruled feudal China entered into a series of treaties designed not only to end existing wars, but to remove all causes of war. The final document was in many ways more complete than the Versailles Peace Treaty, for it included important economic clauses which laid on each feudal state the obligation to share its natural wealth with other states less fortunate. One powerful prince who signed by smearing the document with sacrificial blood was taken to task by his ministers. They pointed out that he had pledged himself to a complete reversal of policy, that he had bound himself to refrain

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from extending his own domain by the absorption of weaker states. The prince laughed at their qualms. It was impossible, he assured them, to draw up any treaty in such terms that no pretext could be found for breaking it.

From her subsequent actions it is obvious to anyone that Japan regards her treaty obligations in the practical and realistic spirit of this ancient Chinese prince. There is no indication that she had for a moment any idea of carrying out either the letter or the spirit of her promises. Nevertheless, her diplomats in all parts of the world began preaching about a new policy towards China and led a great many people to believe that Japan had had a change of heart, that she was willing to let China work out her own salvation – which was all that China was asking for. Even though I had seen so much first-hand evidence of Japanese aggression, I was half convinced myself.

While these treaty obligations were resented by the ruling classes of Japan – principally the military clique – they were welcomed by a small group of timorous liberals

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and by a larger but equally timorous group of business men. China was a most important market, and so far as the business men were concerned all that Japanese aggression had accomplished had been the creation of anti-Japanese boycotts which had killed a large part of the Chinese trade. As practical students of economics they knew that with her geographic position and given favourable circumstances Japan could out-distance all competitors in China. They had already, for the sale of Japanese goods to China was far ahead of that of any other country until anti-Japanese boycotts provoked by harsh military measures, made it possible for America to step in and usurp Japan's position of supremacy. However, the opinions of both liberal and business men in Japan have never carried the slightest weight with the militarists, who look down upon both civilian groups with stern soldierly contempt.

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The end of the War in Europe did not contribute to the peace of China, but only added to the general atmosphere of gloom and pessi-

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mism, although the signing of the Armistice ushered in a brief period of hope. China had followed the lead of the United States in joining the Allies and assumed that the Allied victory would give her a just claim for the righting of some of the wrongs under which she suffered.

The official American War propaganda which I circulated so industriously in China was partly to blame for this hopefulness. Acting on instructions from the State Department in Washington, I had had all of President Wilson's War speeches translated and published in Chinese. In fact, the complete texts were cabled to me for that purpose. For months this collection of speeches was the most popular book in China, running into many editions. I received thousands of letters in comment, so many that my staff of Chinese interpreters could not find time to read them. As I remember, the letters numbered more than 10,000 and represented every class of literate Chinese. They came in such quantities that we finally made no pretence of reading them but merely opened them to see whether they contained

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money, for many of our correspondents ordered books for distribution to their friends. I recall that one North China war lord who is now a prominent member of the National government at Nanking ordered 500 copies -- he was giving a copy to each of his officers and compelling them to read it.

As a result of all this propaganda the Chinese came to the conclusion that the peace which promised so much to Europe and the rest of the world meant a great deal to them also, that in some way they would be helped out of their difficulties. They felt confident that after all President Wilson had said about self-determination and the rights of weak nations against powerful ones, the least the peace conference could do would be to disavow Japanese claims in Shantung and restore the territory which Germany had seized just a few years before the Boxer uprising. A great many Chinese who credited me with a much more important official position than I occupied asked me about this and I did not hesitate to tell them that their hopes were quite justified. I think this expressed the opinion of the American legation.

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Under these circumstances the terms of the peace treaty discouraged and embittered China. At Versailles it was learned that Japan – as the price of her entry into the War – had compelled England and France to make a secret agreement confirming Japan's acquisition of German rights in China. It was the discovery of these agreements which proved so disconcerting to President Wilson when he went to Paris prepared to implement the ideals of justice and humanity which he had promised the world.

Chinese delegates sat at the Peace Conference and day by day saw their hopes still further crushed, their claims ignored. So incensed were they that they refused to sign the treaty. But the claims of China were not entirely overlooked. During the Boxer uprising the German troops in Peking had seized the ancient bronze astronomical instruments from the Imperial Astronomical Observatory and sent them to Potsdam, where they remained as a souvenir of the part Germany played in suppressing the Boxers. The Versailles Peace Conference compelled Germany to return the astrono-



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mical instruments to China. It was the booby prize of the War and was regarded by the Chinese as nothing more than an ironical gesture.

A sympathetic consideration of China's problems by the peace delegates would have given patriotic Chinese new hope and would undoubtedly have hastened the unity of the country, so long delayed. Confirmation of Japan's seizure of Shantung, on the other hand, only helped to promote unrest and anarchy. Furthermore, Japan's success in seizing a Chinese province encouraged the Chinese war lords in similar depredations. The disastrous civil wars continued with first one war lord and then another in the ascendancy, each striving for the rich prize of governmental authority which went with control of Peking. A successful general seized one or more provinces, taxed the people to the limit, enriched himself by the proceeds, and maintained a poorly-paid rabble of an army with which he menaced other war lords or levied blackmail on rich cities. Indeed, for twenty years after the outbreak of the Republican Revolution on October 10, 1911,

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there was never a period when China could be said to have been at peace, and there were few days when fighting was not going on some place in the country.

While there was little that any individual nation could do to help China out of these difficulties, there was a great deal that Japan did do to help perpetuate them, for she continued her programme of encouraging disruption. She pursued not one policy in China, but a dozen, each designed to promote her interest with one particular war lord. Some she bribed, some she threatened, and with some she actually went to war: little engagements in one part of China or another which have now been half forgotten. With her superior equipment and well-trained troops these petty wars always resulted in easily won victories, but Japan never withdrew her troops without exacting a heavy penalty, usually in the form of a truce protocol which Japan interpreted as giving her some permanent rights. The protocols, or other agreements, were always signed for China by some war lord who represented nothing but his own trifling faction and who

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might be, and often was, deposed a few months later, but Japan invariably held them to be permanently binding and stood ever ready to engage in another local war to enforce these rights and secure others. Many of the agreements were verbal and practically all were secret, and Japan never failed to insist on her own interpretation. Yet these casual and transitory contracts, which would have no standing in an international court of justice, are very frequently the only evidence of the 'rights' about which Japanese diplomats talk so glibly.

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During this post-revolution period the morale of the Chinese people was at a very low ebb. The first fine enthusiasm which had followed the end of the Manchu rule had died out, leaving disgust and disappointment. None of the things the revolution had promised had been accomplished. For more than three hundred years the Chinese had been ruled by the Manchus as a nation of slaves. They had fought for freedom, but they had yet to taste its fruits. Indeed, their

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pseudo-freedom was worse than their former slavery, for the state of slavery had, after a manner, been disciplined and orderly, while freedom brought only chaos and confusion. The uncertainty and distress extended to every phase of life. In throwing off Manchu rule the Chinese also threw off the restraints which they had come to associate with their former rulers. These included a great many social institutions which constituted the backbone of Chinese civilisation. In their hatred for the old and their blind groping for the new they even abandoned Confucianism. Later on they were to return to the teachings of Confucius and salvage the best of the old, but for the moment everything was scrapped. China was a country whose moral foundations had been not entirely destroyed but temporarily discarded.

During this period of chaos when war lords fought selfishly for their own interests, there was one political party – the Kuo Min Tang, organised by Sun Yat-Sen – which with a good many faltering steps carried on the ideals of the revolution. Its weakness was that it was a revolutionary party, a party

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which had been organised and had existed for years solely to bring about the downfall of the Manchus. Its members had been trained on the destructive side of revolution, and so intensely that many of them had given little thought to what they would do when the Manchu rule was ended. This lack of preparation for the administration of the country might have been remedied had the revolution followed schedule. But by an accident the conflict started and the Manchu dynasty collapsed several years before the date set by the revolutionaries. The old machinery of government had to be discarded and there was no new machinery to take its place in the bitter years which followed. Chinese in many parts of the country were to learn that though a corrupt and oppressive government is bad, it is better than no government at all, and infinitely preferable to the government of corrupt and oppressive war lords.

This group of Chinese patriots comprising the Kuo Min Tang never lost faith in the destiny of their country and continued to work for its unity in spite of the most dis-

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couraging circumstances. They were not only leaderless; their political experience was circumscribed and they wavered from one idea to another. They wanted a unified China which would be at peace with itself and the world, and they were willing to compromise with their own individual ideas in order to gain this end. They wanted also – and this was an even more popular rallying-cry – the abolition of the ‘unequal treaties’ which gave foreigners in China special rights and privileges. Anyone who had a new theory to suggest for the accomplishment of either of these aims was sure to acquire plenty of followers who would desert him as soon as a more interesting or promising theory was presented. Those who attempted to follow Sun Yat-Sen, the father of the revolution, found themselves often in a difficult position, for his political views were in the process of formation and were necessarily unstable. He tried out many ideas, only to discard them and adopt others.

For a time Communism appeared to offer the solution, and Communist agitators and organisations were welcomed. The movement

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gave indication of making such headway that we foreign business men in Shanghai organised what was called 'The Constitutional Defence League', and made huge contributions to its support. I was put in charge of the propaganda work, with three secretaries who were kept busy writing letters in English, French, Russian, and Chinese. In addition we mailed out tons of booklets and in various ways attracted the attention of Bolshevik spies who made life interesting for us. We tried to play politics with Chinese war lords – I was present at a good many secret and mysterious conferences – but when the war lords learned that we would neither lend them money nor supply them with arms they lost all interest in us. I don't think we accomplished anything whatsoever. And later Communism, as a national movement, died a natural death of malnutrition.

I feel sure, from what many Chinese afterwards told me, that the trend towards Communism which appeared so strong about 1926 was not due primarily to admiration for Communist doctrines. But because the Soviet party had apparently consolidated and

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unified the chaotic country of Russia, it was hoped that Communism would accomplish the same thing for China. As a matter of fact the Communist advisers taught the Chinese how to organise a political party, and when that had been accomplished the Chinese had no further use for them and they returned to Russia, leaving but little of their Communist teachings behind them. The machinery of the Kuo Min Tang is identical with the machinery of the Communist party, but that is as far as the similarity goes.

A new generation was growing up, a generation of young men who were mere youngsters at the time of the Republican Revolution. Among them were Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek; Dr. H. H. Kung, the Minister of Finance; and Dr. C. T. Wang, the Chinese ambassador to the United States. Amid the intense provincial differences and the bitterness of selfish civil wars, this group of men found themselves in agreement on important points and worked relentlessly for a unified China. But before their purpose could be accomplished it was necessary to



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fight several more civil wars and to subdue a number of reactionary war lords.

In the welter of war lords who made little pretence that they were fighting for anything but their own gain, Chiang Kai-Shek began to emerge as a war lord of a different stamp. He enforced a rigid discipline not only on his men, but on himself. Like other war lords, he levied taxes on the territory he occupied, but his taxes were not unreasonably heavy and he paid his troops and kept them from looting. He worked for the popular support of all classes, but in order to obtain it he had to overcome the suspicion and distrust which was his heritage from the other war lords. He said that he was fighting for a unified China. But the other war lords had said the same thing, and everyone knew that they meant only that they wanted to rule all of China, so that they would have larger, richer fields to tax. For some time Chiang Kai-Shek, in the eyes of both foreigners and Chinese, was just another war lord, one of the many we had seen come on the stage with a certain glory - only to be driven off. But as he progressed, General

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Chiang and the group who surrounded him became more articulate by announcing their adherence to the political theories of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. For after his death his theories had been formulated into a code which could be followed with an assurance that was impossible during his lifetime. Chiang Kai-Shek further allied himself with the great Chinese leader by marrying Miss Mai-Ling Soong, the talented Wellesley graduate whose older sister was the wife of Sun Yat-Sen. A third sister married Dr. Kung, the present Minister of Finance. Their brother, T. V. Soong, is a financier who has played an important part in the building of modern China. Thus a small group of Chinese leaders who had more or less common political aims attained that family unity which is so important in China.

Though a few factions and leaders in different parts of the country were working towards the same ends, it appeared for a long time that they could find no common ground on which to operate. There were hundreds of instances of strife between those who should have been friends, and of grossest treachery.

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Sun Yat-Sen himself, shortly before his death, became a political partisan, and on the defeat of the party with which he had allied himself was in exile in Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek led his national army to a rather easy victory at Nanking, only to find himself discredited in the eyes of the world by the actions of his own troops. At the instigation of rivals, who were jealous of Chiang's rising power, the attack on Nanking had been turned into an anti-foreign movement and had resulted in the murder of a number of foreigners, including a half-dozen Americans. The anti-foreign movement grew, and for a time so completely absorbed Chinese attention that everything else was forgotten. Then, like Communism, it died a natural death, except for the anti-alien sentiment, which will exist in China so long as foreigners continue to enjoy their present special privileges.

A short time after the tragedy at Nanking General Chiang met with his first interference from the Japanese, who, among the foreigners having interests in China, were the first to recognise his growing strength.

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Marching northwards from Canton, he dislodged the reactionary war lords of Hankow and Nanking, and then started on what appeared would be a victorious march to the ancient capital of Peking, the goal of all who wished to rule China. This would have been an easy victory except that it did not fit in with the plans of the Japanese war lords to allow any one Chinese leader to hold so much power.

On the pretext of protecting the lives of their nationals, Japanese troops were thrown into Tsinanfu, effectively blocking the advance on Peking. Anxious only to bring about the unity of his own country and wishing to avoid conflicts with all foreign powers, Chiang turned back to Nanking. Consequently it was here, rather than at Peking, that the capital of the National government of China was established in 1927. The name given to the government was the expression of a hope rather than the announcement of a realisation for it was national only in spirit. Actually it controlled five of the eighteen provinces, but those were, in a number of ways, the most important. They concentrated the greater part of the

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wealth of the country, as well as the most progressive elements of the population.

The new government at first had to contend with the suspicion and distrust which had been directed towards every government in China. But soon it became evident that under the selfishness and self-seeking that attend any political movement there was a solid substratum of honesty and sincerity, coupled with a passion for efficiency which was hitherto unknown in governmental affairs of China. Although Chiang Kai-Shek was a war lord and had established his rule by means of arms, he did not – like other victorious war lords – surround himself exclusively by military henchmen. As far as it was possible without endangering the solidarity of his government he kept aloof from civil affairs, turning those over to men who had had nothing to do with war and whose thoughts were not tinged by the military tradition. The Chinese patriots who had been ignored by other war lords were now for the first time given an opportunity to work, an opportunity for which many of them had been waiting for more than fifteen

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years. Each one, almost without exception, was interested in some special form of progress: public health, highways, education, flood control, forest conservation. With new outlets provided for their energies they abandoned revolution to give their attention to constructive labours.

Civil warfare did not cease entirely, but clashes between rival forces were no longer so frequent nor did they take in such a wide area as formerly. The outlying provinces maintained their independence of the National government, or gave it a half-hearted doubtful allegiance, but it was hoped that national unity could be brought about by negotiation rather than by further civil warfare. The programme proved remarkably successful, though not completely successful until the attacks by Japan in 1937 forced a consolidation of interests which might never have been effected in any other way.

Members of the Kuo Min Tang who now filled the governmental offices, went about the job of governing the country with all the enthusiasm of amateurs. And naturally, as amateurs do, they made many mistakes.

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They were in a desperate hurry for they realised that China was centuries behind the times. And fright added to their haste because no Chinese had ever taken Japan's promises seriously, and they all knew that the only thing that would save China from Japan was unity and strength. They were well enough versed as Confucianists, moreover, to know that military strength in itself is not sufficient. So while the military experts gave their armies the best training any Chinese armies had ever received, others took up the task of building a new nation out of the sound timbers left from the wreck of an old civilisation. Out of the chaos a few definite achievements began to emerge. The first was official honesty. It was a qualified honesty, of course, as all official honesty must be, but any kind of official honesty in China was a novelty. It had always been taken for granted that officials would steal every cent of the taxpayers' money. Only occasionally during the Manchu régime had an official built a bridge or a school out of money he might have kept for himself, without exciting public outcry. When one did, the people

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were so grateful that they built a memorial arch in memory of the official and his extraordinary act of justice. But in all of China there were few who merited such expression of public gratitude.

These new officials of the Nationalist government may have stolen some of the money, but they did not steal all, for they began immediately spending huge sums on all kinds of public improvements. The most noticeable enterprise was a network of highways which, in an amazingly short time, covered the country. The leaders of New China were keenly conscious that the greatest weakness of the country lay in its provincialism, and that unity achieved by force of arms would not endure so long as provincial jealousies and antagonisms were perpetuated. The only practical way in which differences could be broken down was by the building of roads, railways, and telegraph lines. This work was carried forward so rapidly that it astonished those of us who lived in China. Places which had formerly been reached by slow and tedious travel through canals and creeks were now approached by



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good motor roads: journeys of weeks were shortened to days, while journeys of days were shortened to hours. As fast as motor roads were opened cheap bus lines were established, and China became a nation of travellers. Millions had their horizons broadened by visits which they or their relatives made to near-by towns -- towns they had never seen before, though their families had lived in the neighbourhood for generations.

The aeroplane shortened distances in a still more dramatic way. Soon after the Tientsin-Pukow railway was opened in 1912, I made a hurried trip from Shanghai to Peking, and as I missed none of the rail connections the journey was accomplished in the remarkably brief period of five days. Four years ago a great many people were eating an early breakfast in Shanghai and meeting friends for cocktails in Peking. Ten years ago a letter from Shanghai to Chengtu, the capital of the far western province of Szechuen, might reach its destination in seventeen days -- about the time it would take for a letter from Shanghai to New York. Three years ago a

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letter posted early in the morning in Shanghai would reach Chengtu the same afternoon. Government officials all became aeroplane travellers, visiting distant provinces frequently for discussion of local problems with the local authorities.

The widest possible use was made of the radio. In all the provinces under control of the National government every district magistrate was supplied with a radio set with which he listened to the official broadcasts from Nanking, and so was kept informed on all governmental policies and actions. What a change from the old days when official communications were written out by hand and dispatched by messengers, and were often weeks in transit, though the distance was less than a hundred miles!

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For several years following the Washington Conference, Japanese policy gave evidence of having changed. The Washington Conference had by some means compelled Japan to return Shantung to China, it had provided for the revision of China's customs duties, and

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had in other ways given China some of the things she had confidently expected to receive from the Versailles Peace Conference. The provisions spelled a defeat for the Japanese military party, but were welcomed in many liberal quarters of Japan where it was argued that Japan's prosperity was best assured by a peaceful and prosperous China. This has been the point of view of most of the business men of Japan who, in spite of propaganda by the military, have never been wholly convinced that the expansion of Japanese territory was an economic necessity. The mounting annual total for military expenditure has made them more than doubtful as to the wisdom of the military policy. Of course when Japan's military clique has recorded some gain in the name of the emperor, these same business men have cheered as loudly as any. To fail to do so would be to commit *lèse-majesté*, which is not only a heinous moral crime, but may bring serious consequences.

Balked by the Conference, for the time being the military sheathed their swords and turned their hand to propaganda, in which pursuit they were assisted by a great many

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diplomats and civilians. They made what was apparently a very honest effort to convince all the Asiatic peoples, especially the Chinese, that their hope for prosperity and security lay in consolidation, so that they might present a solid front against the dominant white races. With their usual thoroughness they scattered the seed of this propaganda lavishly, but in China it fell on stony soil. The Chinese knew better than anyone else what the Japanese plans were. They listened with a good deal of amused scepticism to the grandiose programme for a Pan-Asiatic League, to the slogan of 'Asia for the Asiatics' – knowing that in each case what the protagonists of these fine ideas had in mind was an Asia dominated by Japan. The Siamese, to whom Japan made very friendly advances, were equally sceptical. To them China was the grandfather and the grandmother of the Asiatic peoples, Japan only a bumptious stepchild devoid of proper manners and ignorant of the rules of Oriental propriety.

Equally ardent advances were made to the Filipinos, but these nephews of Uncle Sam do

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not look on themselves as Asiatics. They are proud of the Spanish culture which was imposed on them at the point of a bayonet, and are even prouder of the thin American veneer which they have acquired under almost identical circumstances. Japan got nowhere with that venture.

At the same time that the Japanese statesmen were toying with this idea of a Pan-Asiatic League they hopefully put out a few other suggestions which they thought might bring them some useful returns. One was that all coloured peoples should unite as they had interests in common which were quite distinct from, and in some ways opposed to, those of the white races. They pointed out that Negroes, Chinese, Japanese, Malays, Indians, Siamese and many others whose skin was coloured or tinged had been subdued and oppressed by the whites, and that they might regain their natural rights if they would form a solid front under a strong leader – who would, naturally, be Japan. Japanese agents established friendly relations in Abyssinia and an especial appeal was made to the American Negro. The numerous races of British

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India were not overlooked. Nor were Buddhists. By the visits of Japanese Buddhist priests to Ceylon, the existence of this common religious bond was stressed. However, the whole venture was such a complete failure that the Japanese soon abandoned it, and by now it has been almost forgotten. For a year or more the Negro and Indian propagandists who were directed and paid by Japan managed to justify their existence by occasional articles in newspapers and magazines. But even they eventually gave up.

Another idea of the Japanese propagandists was that of an 'Asiatic Monroe Doctrine'. The thought behind this catch phrase was that Japan, as the leading power in Asia, had as much right to declare a Monroe Doctrine for Asia as the United States had to declare a Monroe Doctrine for the Americas. This was all very well as far as it went, but everyone who knew anything about the situation knew that the weaker Oriental nations needed no protection from any nation but Japan herself, and to make Japan the guardian of the weaker Asiatic peoples was said by

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the Chinese to be like appointing a weasel to guard the chicken-house.

The Japanese propagandists had been given a fair opportunity, had spent a great deal of government money – and had accomplished nothing. Whereupon the Japanese militarists decided that the time for talk was past. If they were going to get anywhere with their programme the only thing for them to do was to act without regard to world opinion and let the diplomats and propagandists explain and justify a *fait accompli*. This would be much less difficult, anyway, than preparing the way for action, or trying to convince a stubborn people like the Chinese that they should place themselves under Japan's guidance and protection.

The keynote of this new or revised policy was sounded by Premier Baron Tanaka in a memorial which he is said to have presented to the emperor on July 25, 1927. The Baron wrote:

In a certain sense Manchuria and Mongolia are key positions, by holding which we can seize the wealth of the whole of

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China. After this, we shall subjugate India, the South Seas, Asia Minor and Central Asia, and finally Europe.

The existence of this memorial has been denied, but the Tanaka policy, which has since been followed by Japan, does not rest on that document alone. While he was premier Baron Tanaka made many similar statements in public, all of them justifying a policy which rested entirely on force. He foretold future events in Manchuria when he said that 'if disturbances spread to Manchuria and Mongolia and as a result peace and order are disrupted, thereby menacing our special rights and interests in this region', Japan would 'defend them no matter whence the menace comes'.

If there was any doubt about the intentions of Japan towards China in the minds of Chinese anywhere, it was dispelled in the autumn of 1931 by the Japanese action in Manchuria. This far northern territory of China, the ancestral home of the Manchus, had for centuries been a political battlefield jointly coveted by Japan and Russia. It



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became an actual battlefield when these two countries went to war. Though both Russia and Japan had at times sought to detach Manchuria and make it a separate administrative unit, China had maintained at least a theoretical sovereignty over the area, collected the customs duties, and administered the postal and telegraph services. In the turmoil which followed the revolution of 1911 Manchuria fell into the hands of Marshal Chang Tso-Lin, the most powerful of the numerous war lords.

Chang was the leader of a large band of bandits when hostilities began between Japan and Russia, and the Japanese took advantage of his organisation. Chang was supplied with money and munitions, and under the guidance of Japanese leaders made successful guerilla attacks on the Russians. Then with the end of the Russo-Japanese war Chang returned to his old profession of banditry. But the termination of the Manchu régime made him ambitious to play a larger role. His thousands of bandit followers formed an army which drove other bandits and small war lords out of Manchuria, and Marshal Chang

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established himself at Mukden as the ruler of a vast territory, for Manchuria embraced three rich Chinese provinces.

Since even as a bandit he had been a *protégé* of Japan and under Japanese protection, it is reasonable to presume that his ambitions may have come as a result of Japanese inspiration. Certainly for some years after he became the dictator of Manchuria he followed Japanese suggestions. But with the growth of the National party he became restive and, much against the wishes of his former Japanese friends, surrounded himself with British and American advisers. By the beginning of 1928, the rift between him and the Japanese was complete.

In June of that year Marshal Chang was returning from a political visit to Peking and was nearing Mukden when a mysterious bomb exploded, blowing up the train and killing him. The mystery of the bomb was never definitely cleared up, but it was established that the railway line was heavily guarded by Japanese troops and that it would have been practically impossible for anyone

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to place the bomb without the knowledge of the Japanese military authorities. This coupled with the fact that the marshal had outlived his usefulness to Japan led to some very obvious conclusions. Foreigners who lived in the Far East, including officials, had no doubt but that the Japanese authorities had taken this method to rid themselves of an outworn puppet.

With the death of Marshal Chang the overlordship of Manchuria fell naturally into the hands of his son, Chang Hsueh-Liang, popularly known throughout China as 'the Young Marshal'. Before the end of the year he completed the break with the Japanese and openly affronted them by avowing his allegiance to the National government. He gave up his status of an independent and powerful war lord and accepted in its place an appointment as general in the National army. He flew the flag of the National government over his headquarters and over all government offices in Manchuria. Agents of the Kuo Min Tang flocked to Mukden and spread propaganda against Japanese interference in Manchurian affairs.

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The Young Marshal's defiance of Japan was a rather vain and futile gesture. He had stepped into his father's shoes, but did not fill them. His was not the strong, dominant personality which had enabled the older man to rise from the position of a bandit chieftain and become the ruler of a large part of China. The son ruled Manchuria, but not securely. The troops under his command were actually his father's troops. They had been trained by the first marshal and the unswerving loyalty they had given to him was not transferred to the son. The independent course which the Young Marshal mapped out for himself was one which he did not have strength enough to follow.

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In September of 1931 the Japanese military clique who had been watching events in Manchuria very attentively decided that the time had come for their first great coup – the annexation of Manchuria and the setting up of a buffer state which would actually be a part of the Japanese Empire. There could be no doubt but that peace and order had

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been disturbed in Manchuria and Japan's interests had been menaced. The adherence of the Young Marshal to the Kuo Min Tang party had given great encouragement to the liberal element in Manchuria and there was renewed agitation against the special rights which Japan held there, largely because of her ownership of the South Manchuria railway. Agitation reached violent proportions when a Japanese army officer who disappeared was later found to have been murdered.

Preparations for this coup had been under way for a long time. More than a year before this the gangling, near-sighted Henry Pu Yi – who in 1911 had been the 'boy emperor' of China – was smuggled out of his official residence in Peking and installed in comfortable quarters in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin. In him the Japanese plotters found a willing tool. The Manchu imperial household had been treated very shabbily by the rulers of Republican China. The pension which had been agreed upon as one of the terms of abdication had not been paid. The ex-emperor had not been accorded the

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honours which were due to him. On the other hand, he had not carried out his part of the abdication agreement, but had plotted with the Manchu princes and had actually allowed himself to be used in an abortive attempt to restore the monarchy. It was in order to prevent a recurrence of plots of this kind that the Chinese had made him a virtual prisoner in one of the old Peking palaces his ancestors had built. Naturally there was bad blood on both sides.

Henry Pu Yi was quite willing to lend himself to any scheme which would chagrin the rulers of China, and the prospect of becoming emperor of Manchuria – which was the ancient home of his forefathers – was undoubtedly a dazzling one. It was a prospect to dazzle the most strong-minded man and even his most sincere admirers have never said that Henry Pu Yi was more than amiable and rather spineless. He had just the temperament to fit his present position of puppet ruler. It probably never occurred to him that although he was founding a new dynasty there would be no descendants to enjoy the glory. For he was not only childless, but

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impotent -- the taking of concubines had proven futile.

This last detail did not escape the Japanese plotters. If Pu Yi was made the emperor of the new state and died childless, as he obviously would, then the throne would be occupied by his younger brother. With characteristic attention to detail the Japanese empire-builders secured the acquiescence of the younger brother to the plot, promising him the undisputed succession to the throne if he would, in turn, promise to take a Japanese bride of their selection. It is easy to see that by awarding a series of Japanese brides to succeeding generations of Manchukuo emperors, they could be assured that the rulers of the puppet state would have a constantly increasing proportion of Japanese blood. Thus, if the eugenic fates allowed their plans to be carried to a logical conclusion there would, in the course of a few generations, be an emperor in Manchukuo who would be virtually a full-blooded Japanese.

So far as the Japanese militarists themselves are concerned, they see no reason to justify

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any action taken in the name of the emperor for the advancement of their ambitions. They would greatly enjoy a world where troublesome diplomats of other countries did not bring up embarrassing questions concerning such abstractions as 'right' and 'wrong' and 'justice'. But so long as questions of this sort are bound to be asked, the militarists always go to a good deal of trouble to provide pretexts for their actions. If there is no suitable incident at hand to use as a pretext, they create one. There have been so many of these artificially-created Japanese 'incidents' during the past decade that in the Far East the word has come to have a new and rather sinister meaning.

In this particular case the pretext was an alleged act of sabotage by an unknown group of Chinese who were said to have torn up some rails in the Japanese-owned South Manchuria railway, very near the spot where a bomb explosion had killed Marshal Chang Tso-Lin a few years before – a spot heavily guarded by Japanese police. Former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, recording this episode, wrote:



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The incident which was claimed by the Japanese to have caused their action . . . diminished to such small proportions as strongly to suggest its actual non-existence. Meanwhile the Japanese army was found to have acted with such promptness and celerity as to make it evident that they were moving under a previously arranged strategic plan. Although the clash on the railway line did not occur until ten o'clock at night on September 18th, that same night the Japanese attacked and captured the Chinese barracks and the great arsenal in Mukden, in which the main war supplies of the entire Manchurian Chinese army were stored, and before daylight all their forces in Manchuria and some of those in Korea had been brought into action throughout the whole area of Southern Manchuria.<sup>1</sup>

The Japanese military authorities had correctly appraised the strength of the troops under the Young Marshal, for there was

<sup>1</sup>From *The Far Eastern Crisis* by Henry L. Stimson, published by Harper & Brothers, New York.

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practically no opposition to the Japanese advance except on the part of one or two individual commanders. The war lords of Japan had again proven to themselves and to the Japanese people that they were invincible. With the ease of a well-oiled machine, Pu Yi was dragged from his home in Tientsin and his Japanese masters acclaimed him emperor of the newly created state of Manchukuo!

This Japanese invasion and conquest of Manchuria was exhaustively investigated by the neutral and international Lytton Commission, made up of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. There were no minority reports. The Commission unanimously condemned the injustice of the whole sorry business.

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Japan's undeclared war on Shanghai, which was fought in the early part of 1932, came as a sequel to the Manchurian adventure, but in explaining it we must again transfer ourselves to a Gilbert and Sullivan background and describe the very curious

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rivalry that exists between the Japanese army and navy. When Commodore Perry opened Japan, the rulers of the country set about its unification by the creation of a National army and navy to replace the fighting forces of the feudal lords. It was logical that the nucleus of the army should come from the powerful and warlike Chioshu clan and that the officers to be trained for the new Japanese navy should be selected from the Satsuma clan with its maritime traditions. Each branch of the service has been built into a huge machine but provincial differences which have always existed between the two clans have been perpetuated. Everyone with a wide acquaintance among Japanese army and navy officers, no matter under what national flag he serves, is aware of this strong professional jealousy intensified by provincial jealousies. We would doubtless find a counterpart of the situation in America if all the West Point cadets were appointed from the New England States and all the midshipmen at Annapolis came from south of the Mason and Dixon line. In this way the old sectional differences between the North and South would be

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fostered just as the ancient feudal animosities of the Chioshu and Satsuma clans are fostered in Japan.

Japanese participation in the World War was purely a navy show. The navy captured Tsing-tao and patrolled certain lines of the sea, affording protection against German raiders. When, at the Versailles Peace Conference, Japan was given a mandate over the former German possessions in the South Seas and the occupation of Shantung was confirmed, these came as a gift to the emperor from the navy. For the moment the army was in the background.

Then the army by its brilliant and almost bloodless victory in Manchuria reversed the position. In this coup the navy played no part and very probably was not fully informed as to the military plans. The Japanese newspapers were full of stories about the bravery of the Japanese troops and the brilliance of the Japanese strategists. The navy was forgotten and had to look for an opportunity to get back into the limelight. The forces stationed at Shanghai, itching for a fight, were not long in finding a very plausible

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pretext. This time they didn't have to create one.

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The Japanese occupation of Manchuria led to a nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods, but there were very few personal attacks on Japanese. The first loss of life occurred on January 18, 1932, when in a free-for-all fight in front of a Chinese factory in a Chinese area of Shanghai two Japanese were wounded, one of them mortally. Two days later a Japanese mob attacked the factory and set fire to it. Three Chinese policemen who were attempting to protect the factory were injured and one of them died. The Japanese casualties were the same — three injured of whom one died.

The Japanese admiral at once presented the Chinese mayor of Greater Shanghai with five demands. The first three required an apology by the mayor, arrest and punishment of the guilty, and payment of damages and hospital bills. The last two asked that the anti-Japanese movement be controlled and all societies fostering anti-Japanese senti-

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ments be dissolved. In reply the mayor signified his willingness to consider the first group, but said that he would have some difficulty in complying with the final demands. In truth, activities in Manchuria had so inflamed Chinese sentiment that it was beyond any official control.

A few hours after this reply was received, Admiral Shiozowa gave public notice through the press that:

Should the mayor of Greater Shanghai fail to give a satisfactory reply to the Japanese and fulfil their demands without delay, the admiral was determined to take the necessary steps in order to protect Japanese imperial rights and interests.

The mayor thereupon appealed to all the local boycott societies to put an end to their activities and followed this up by police action. Offices of the associations were forcibly seized and closed. This accomplished, he had done all that was humanly possible to comply with the demands. Those of us who lived in Shanghai breathed sighs of relief, for it was believed that the crisis had

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been passed and that our city would be spared another unnecessary war.

At eleven o'clock that night the admiral issued a new set of demands to the effect that Chinese troops near Shanghai be immediately withdrawn and all defences removed. To quote again from Secretary Stimson:

The mayor received the message at 11.15. The Japanese troops began their movement at 11.45. It, of course, would have been quite impossible in the short time at their disposal after the notification from the admiral for the Chinese authorities to have arranged for the actual withdrawal of the Chinese troops in the area mentioned.<sup>1</sup>

Promptly at twelve o'clock that night I was awakened, as were most of the other residents of Shanghai, by the sound of field guns, trench mortars, and machine guns, while Japanese reconnaissance planes flew over my residence and threw out flares to enable them to spy out Chinese positions. There followed

<sup>1</sup> From *The Far Eastern Crisis* by Henry L. Stimson, published by Harper & Brothers, New York.

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a little more than a month of fighting, characterised by the stubborn resistance of the Chinese troops, the wanton destruction of Chinese property, and the use of Chinese civilians as living targets in order to train and harden the new Japanese marines. Almost all of the caddies at the Kiangwan golf-course were killed in this way. Months later the old parents of the caddies who had served me for five years told me of the futile tragedy. The Chinese military losses were 4,274 killed. The civilians killed numbered 6,080 with 10,040 missing.

The Japanese had greatly underestimated the strength of the Chinese or greatly overestimated their own strength, or both, for the force of 3,000 men with which they began the attack made no headway. More naval reinforcements were brought up, but eventually the army had to be called in to finish the war the navy had started.

In the end, after considerable loss of life on each side, the Japanese gained little more than they had been promised by the Chinese authorities when their demands were accepted by the mayor of Greater Shanghai. The



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additional gain was the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the vicinity of Shanghai and the dismantling of the old and useless fort at Woo-sung. As far as accomplishing their main objective was concerned – the ending of anti-Japanese sentiment in China – they had not only failed lamentably, but they were in a worse position than before. It meant nothing that the mayor had by the use of police force closed the offices of the anti-Japanese societies; anti-Japanese feeling was a turbulent flood which nothing could constrain.

On the other hand, Japanese aggressions were doing for China what the Chinese leaders had been trying with varying success to do for themselves – that is, to unify the country. Hatred of Japan obsessed all. It is true that it was a negative sort of unity, but it was a unity which for the moment overshadowed a great many provincial and political differences. Japanese civilians, of whom more than 100,000 lived in China, helped to keep the resentment at fever heat. They anticipated an early conquest of the country and in consequence adopted a very

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truculent attitude towards Chinese civilians, treating them as if they were already the subjects of Japan. When cases involving Japanese were being tried, attempts were made to bully the Chinese courts.

In the following years this hostility between the nationals of the two countries led to a number of clashes in which Japanese were killed – less than a dozen in five years – some by mobs and some by secret assassins. There seems no doubt but that some, if not all, of the assassinations were inspired by a desire to force the National government into a war with Japan, a contest for which she was entirely unprepared. In spite of constant agitation the consistent policy of the government was to build up its defences, but avoid a conflict with its neighbour.

In each case of assassination or murder the Chinese authorities made a careful investigation and some of the guilty parties were brought to trial and punished. In other instances it was obviously impossible to fix the guilt. To foreign residents of Shanghai it was a constant source of surprise that there were so few of these fatal incidents. I feel sure that

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under similar conditions in America the life of no Japanese resident would have been safe.

The Japanese naval forces in Shanghai continued to make their presence felt in many ways obnoxious to the local residents, foreign and Chinese alike. British soldiers and American marines to the number of several thousand were quartered in the International Settlement, but they were rarely seen except at band concerts and other entertainments which they gave for the benefit of the local residents. They were there solely for the protection of their nationals, and their officers saw to it that they cultivated friendly relationships with the Chinese and did nothing to antagonise them. American marines taught the Chinese to play baseball. British soldiers taught them football.

In contrast, the Japanese marines were continually in the public eye with their unnecessary displays of military strength. Long lines of armoured cars and tanks marched through the streets of Shanghai day after day for no apparent reason other than to impress all observers with the military might of Dai Nippon. It was not at all unusual to see

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truckloads of Japanese marines drive slowly through crowded Nanking Road with rifles at the ready raking each side of the street. This was bad enough, but the night manœuvres were infinitely worse. Often at an early hour in the morning peaceful citizens would be awakened by the sound of military commands, the rumble of armoured cars, and the measured tramp of moving troops. Japanese marines in full war kit and equipment occupied whole sections of the city, put up barbed-wire entanglements, and manned machine-gun nests. All that was lacking of real warfare was the order to fire. These tactics naturally terrified the local Chinese population and on a great many occasions there was a hurried exodus. Since most of the manœuvres were carried out in the Hangkow section of the International Settlement, given over to Chinese middle-class residences and shops, the section became extremely unpopular – so much so that there was a sharp drop in realty values.

In order to avoid further depreciation in real-estate value and guard against the possibility of incidents, the authorities of the

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International Settlement asked the Japanese navy to give notice when night manœuvres were scheduled to take place, so that the Chinese residents might be warned and reassured. The Japanese authorities promised to do this, but they often forgot.

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The tense situation which persisted in Shanghai was not without its humorous side, made possible by the fact that the Japanese, as a race, are devoid of all sense of humour as Chinese and Anglo-Saxons understand the term. I have often thought that the theory of the Malayan origin of the Japanese race must have evolved from the knowledge that the Japanese are distinctly Malayan in their lack of a sense of the comic relief.

One summer evening three years ago, a Chinese was spending an idle hour in a cheap cabaret near the Japanese Naval Landing Party headquarters, eating a pear. When the pear was finished he carelessly tossed the core into the street, where it struck a member of the Japanese Naval patrol which happened to be passing by. The patrol halted and

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stationed sentries at the entrance to the cabaret. Reinforcements were sent for and the cabaret was surrounded. A careful search resulted in the discovery of a cuspidor in which there were a number of pear peelings, and a comparison of these peelings with what was left of the core proved beyond doubt the origin of that murderous missile.

But as there were a hundred Chinese in the place, any one of whom might have been eating a pear, it was impossible definitely to fix the guilt on a single individual. However, the ends of justice were satisfied in the eyes of the Japanese navy by enforcement of the theory of collective responsibility. For a month thereafter the luckless proprietor of the cabaret was required to appear before the commander of the Japanese Naval Landing Party to present his apologies and his assurances that he no longer sold any pears whose cores might be hurled to the street when Japanese marines were passing by. In order to make sure that he was telling the truth the navy patrols made periodic inspections of his place. These visits were so disturbing that the cabaret proprietor lost most of his business

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and after a few weeks was compelled to close up shop.

A ten-year-old Persian boy on his way home from school put his thumb to his nose and twiddled his fingers at a passing truckful of Japanese marines. The truck was stopped and the marines piled out and gave chase. The boy was caught and kept a prisoner at the naval headquarters for several hours until his parents came and presented their apologies to no less a person than the Japanese admiral himself. The incident was given wide publicity in all the Shanghai newspapers and this inspired many other small boys to twiddle derisive thumbs at Japanese marines – but they were careful to do it from a safe distance.

In Tientsin a Chinese manufacturer put out a brand of laundry soap with the trademark depicting an open umbrella. His shop was raided by Japanese marines, who destroyed his stock, and the shop-keeper was surprised to learn that he had offered a deadly insult to the Japanese emperor. As the rising sun is the national emblem of Japan and as an open umbrella is designed

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to obscure the rays of the sun, the trademark could only be construed as a wish that the rays of the sun be obscured. Hence the deadly insult. Piquancy was added to this incident by the fact that the Chinese manufacturer was feloniously copying the trademark of one of my British clients.

Other incidents were without comic relief. For such trivial offences as bumping into a Japanese marine in civilian uniform Chinese were taken to the naval headquarters and tortured, then released after a warning to show proper deference to Japanese subjects in future. Even Chinese schoolgirls were not exempt from these illegal 'arrests'. At least one Chinese girl, a member of a well-known and highly respected family, was rather severely injured by a squad of Japanese marines who took matters into their own hands and gave her a severe beating without bothering to take her to their commander. It was not only Chinese who were subject to these bullying tactics. There appeared to be a concerted effort on the part of the Japanese to convince all of us that they were



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masters in Shanghai and would brook no interference from anyone. They were at best partially successful for we foreigners gave them a wide berth.

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Plans for the rejuvenation of China were well under way when the loss of Manchuria compelled a complete readjustment of the programme. Encouraged by the return of Shantung and the various treaties guaranteeing territorial integrity, the Chinese leaders had come to feel a certain degree of security in spite of Japanese actions and many believed that they would be allowed to work out their own salvation without danger of interference.

One of the most serious tasks the new government was attempting was the disbandment of the Chinese soldiery, who numbered several million and whose maintenance proved a heavy burden on the country. Even those war lords who acknowledged the authority of the National government still maintained their own armies and, as the price of their loyalty to Nanking, frequently

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called on the Central government for money with which to pay the troops. With some these calls for money were justified and with others it was nothing more than blackmail. As the power of each war lord depended on the troops he could control, they resisted all efforts to cut down forces. Nevertheless a fairly successful movement for reducing the armies was under way when the Japanese seizure of Manchuria served notice on China that she might in the near future have need for all of her armed forces.

The move towards disbandment was forgotten, and instead every effort was made to provide the troops which already existed with modern equipment and to give them better training. A large number of German military experts were employed. China's military air force was weeded of incompetent officers. Then work went forward feverishly to build the few planes and the inadequate personnel into an efficient fighting unit. A staff of experts was brought from America and a modern aviation school set up at Hangchow.

Every penny that could be spared from the government revenue was spent for aeroplanes.

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Landing-fields were surveyed and laid out in all parts of the country. In order to provide funds for this and for the building of highways which could be used for military purposes, a state lottery was organised. And Chiang Kai-Shek's birthday was made the occasion for a popular subscription of millions of dollars for the purchase of government aeroplanes. Mussolini did further honour to the day by sending Chiang Kai-Shek an aeroplane for his personal use.

In the meantime other governmental activities were not being neglected. The National Economic Council was organised in November of 1932 and worked under five heads: Highway Construction, Conservancy and Irrigation, Public Health, Education, Rural Habitation. To recount even in a general way the various enterprises undertaken and carried forward successfully by these different departments would require a volume much larger than this one. Indeed, a semi-official report published in 1936 consists of several volumes and each is as large as *Gone with the Wind* – a title which might well describe the report if China should be de-

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feated in her present struggle for existence. To foreign residents in China these official reports were by no means so impressive or convincing as the picture of a new China which unfolded itself before our eyes. All about us we saw schools and playgrounds, clean streets, honesty in officialdom, and an unfamiliar spirit among the Chinese people, especially the younger ones, which seemed to make a new race of them. I feel sure that no other country made such progress during the same five-year period and that in modern history it would be difficult to find a record of similar progress during any five-year period.

Among the many notable reforms, the most important was that dishonesty and inefficiency in the collection of taxes and the expenditure of official funds became the exception instead of the rule. As statistical evidence, in 1934 the moneys received from the salt taxes – an important source of revenue – were more than five times what they were in 1929. This in spite of the fact that between these two dates Manchuria had become a possession of Japan and the

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revenues from that territory, while included in the 1929 total, were not included in 1934. It was obvious that with further suppression of smuggling and further improvement in the efficiency and integrity of the collection machinery, China's legitimate revenue would be sufficient to meet all of China's need for funds for reconstruction. Dr. H. H. Kung, the Minister of Finance, announced that during the same period more than 3,000 minor local taxes had been abolished. Most of these taxes were levied on the transit of goods, had existed for centuries, and had always been a serious and an annoying impediment to the development of trade.

In 1935 the entire currency system of the country was reformed. Old Chinese currency was based on silver and the silver coins, or the notes which were redeemable in silver coins, represented no more than the market value of the silver they contained. As this value fluctuated from day to day an element of gambling was always present in foreign trade. The problem had bothered merchants and financiers for years, and experts were divided as to whether or not China

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could or should attempt reform and put her currency on the same basis as the currencies of other countries. The National government decided both questions in the affirmative and in a series of official regulations the reform was accomplished. The Chinese dollar was pegged at a certain fixed value in relation to the United States dollar and the British pound sterling. Even during the fighting of recent months it has remained where it was pegged with slighter fluctuations than many other currencies are subject to.

Whenever it was possible for her to do so Japan put obstacles in the way of these reforms. While America and Great Britain welcomed the stabilisation of China's currency as a move which would be of great benefit to all foreign trade, Japan did her best to discredit it and, at official instigation, a few Japanese made the futile and ridiculous gesture of insisting on the use of Japanese currency in Shanghai. In order to prevent the weakening of her currency reserves China declared an embargo on the export of silver, but it was smuggled out by Japanese under more or less open official protection. China

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then called on the foreign banks to surrender their stocks of silver in exchange for the new government bank notes. After a little delay all but the Japanese banks fell in line with the Chinese policy. The Japanese military was already firmly intrenched in North China and refused to allow the trans-shipment from Tientsin of the stocks of silver held there by the Chinese government banks.

In carrying out her programme of reconstruction China called on the League of Nations for help and a great many experts in various lines were sent to assist her. The arrival of each was the occasion of a blustering protest from Japan, who charged that the League was giving military and political assistance. When the American government loaned China \$50,000,000 worth of wheat and cotton the Japanese officials loudly insisted that this was actually a military loan and their clamouring did not cease, nor their protests, even when the ships carrying wheat and cotton from America arrived in Shanghai.

Japan looked with envious and antagonistic eyes on any fragment of evidence of

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China's progress; her programme of conquest was based on the premise of Chinese chaos and inefficiency. It was also quite obvious to the most casual observer that if China's progress were allowed to continue unhindered for a few more years she would be in such a strong position that she would have nothing to fear from Japan.

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Having taken possession of Manchuria, the Japanese war lords who ruled that new empire in the name of the puppet emperor cast longing eyes on the fertile fields of North China and began to talk about an economic block which would be formed of Japan, Korea, Manchukuo, and North China. When Manchuria was seized, a great many Japanese apologists and propagandists had had a good deal to say about Japan's need for a source of raw materials and an outlet for her surplus population. That large part of the American public which is willing to see injustice committed in other parts of the world so long as America can enjoy a cowardly peace, accepted this explanation and



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found satisfaction in the thought that Japanese ambition had now been satisfied. But it appeared that the possession of Manchuria created new and very urgent needs which could only be satisfied by a form of economic co-operation in North China which would include the surrender of Chinese sovereignty over that area.

In carrying out their new plans the Japanese military adopted their old tactics of alliances with local war lords, who were at outs with the central government. They found plenty of opportunity for intrigue in North China, where a number of local war lords and disappointed politicians were jealous of the growing power of the government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. All of these were encouraged in their opposition to the Nanking government and promised support in any attempts they might make to set up an independent local government of their own. Japan's immediate aims would have been satisfied by the setting up of autonomous governments in each of the five Northern provinces of the country — autonomous governments which would flout

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the authority of Nanking, but be amenable to Japanese advice and suggestion. For months the one burning political question in China was whether or not Japan would be able to accomplish this. She certainly bent every effort towards that end. High Japanese officials made frequent calls on the five provincial war lord governors, while lesser officials were at their elbows day and night. They were promised complete independence from Nanking, loans, and advice. The price they were to pay in return was to follow the advice of Japan, chiefly in economic matters.

The great scheme failed, but not entirely. In their canvass of the local Chinese traitors the Japanese found a Chinese resident of Hopei Province who exactly suited their purpose. He had for a long time been on intimate and friendly terms with the Japanese, with whom he did a lot of business, and was married to a Japanese woman. He was a more or less outspoken critic of the National government and had a great deal of personal animosity for Chiang Kai-Shek. In 1935 Shanghai was surprised by the announcement that the Chinese residents of a few

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counties in Hopei Province had declared their independence of the Nanking government and set up an autonomous government of their own. This new government was recognised and supported by the Japanese military with such celerity as to leave no doubt but that they had been active in its organisation. Japanese advisers were at once supplied – at least one in each county, and a score or more at the governmental headquarters. Japanese troops sent to reinforce the local garrison were augmented, more Japanese troops moved into North China, and it was openly announced that Japan was ready to place her armed forces at the disposal of the new government should its authority be disputed.

This was, of course, a direct challenge to the National government, but to accept the challenge and attempt to restore Chinese sovereignty to this area would have meant certain war with Japan. With the Chinese genius for compromise and indirection, they declined to recognise the autonomous government; but at the same time they established a method of working with it by setting

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up a local political council to deal with affairs in this part of China.

The Japanese military clique had in the past circumvented in every possible way the Chinese plans for the improvement of the country. It might be unfair to add the encouragement of the opium and narcotic traffic to the list, but there is no doubt that Japan did not co-operate with the other nations in efforts to suppress this traffic. Furthermore, Japanese concessions provided safe refuges for narcotic factories and Japanese subjects were the principal agents of distribution. Time after time Japan's association with the narcotic traffic was proven and denounced at international conferences, but these denunciations never led to any change in Japan's policy - which was to vigorously prohibit all use of narcotics to Japanese subjects, but to manufacture and sell narcotics freely to all other nationals who wanted them. According to official reports made to the League of Nations, ninety per cent of the world's illicit trade in narcotics was in Japanese hands.

With this autonomous area of North China

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under their control, the Japanese military now added another activity – that of smuggling under official protection. One of the first acts of the autonomous government was to announce a new schedule of import duties – just half of China's regular tariff. Smuggling of goods from the free port of Dairen into China had for forty years provided profitable employment to a large number of Japanese and Koreans, but the amenities of smuggling had always been observed and the operations of smugglers kept secret. Individual boats would land at night in lonely and isolated coves where there was little chance of interference by customs guards.

Now smuggling became as open as legitimate trade. Fleets of boats sailed from Dairen and discharged cargo on the beach at Peitaiho, which was not a port of entry. Customs guards in the service of the Chinese government who attempted to prevent this illegal landing of cargo were beaten off by Japanese soldiers or policemen. As the result of encounters several guards were killed and a number wounded. But when one Korean smuggler was wounded the Japanese

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military demanded, and enforced the demand, that all Chinese customs guards be disarmed. This effectively destroyed their usefulness, for the smugglers were all equipped with bludgeons which they did not hesitate to use.

Later a Chinese coastguard boat intercepted a boatload of smuggled cargo in Chinese territorial waters near Tsing-tao and was fired on. The coastguard returned fire and a few shots went through the Japanese flag which the smuggler was flying. This, the Japanese navy declared, constituted a gross insult to the emperor. An apology was demanded and dismissal of the officers and crew of the offending boat. Following this came the announcement that Chinese coastguard boats interfering with ships flying the Japanese flag would be considered as pirates and sunk without warning. An increased number of Japanese naval units was sent to the China coast to enforce this official order.

With the customs guards disarmed, and the coastguard boats rendered ineffective, the smugglers had a free hand and soon all of North China was filled with smuggled goods,

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much of it trickling south as far as Hangkow and Shanghai. Legitimate traders in Tientsin, mostly British and Americans, found their business at a standstill, for they could not meet this competition. The smuggling was carried on so blatantly that there were frequent reports in the Shanghai newspapers giving details as to the amount of the smuggled cargo. At the Japanese concession in Tientsin, which was the headquarters of the smugglers, warehouses were so full that stuff was stored in the open.

China made repeated protests to Japan, but received no replies. America and Great Britain were equally unsuccessful in attempting to remedy a situation which was strangling all legitimate trade in North China. In an interview the Japanese Consul-General at Tientsin said that he had looked through the statute-books of Japan and was unable to find any law which made it a crime for Japanese subjects to smuggle goods into China.

According to the chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce of Tientsin, more than 13,000 tons of sugar were smuggled into that port in four months and during that

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period not a bag of legitimately imported sugar was landed. It was estimated that the loss in customs revenue to China for one month amounted to \$8,000,000. At the annual meeting of the China Association held in London in 1936 the chairman said: 'The Japanese authorities claim that they are not responsible for the smuggling; the fact remains that the Chinese Maritime Customs authorities in Tientsin are greatly handicapped in dealing with the smugglers by the attitude of Japanese authorities towards the Customs Administration.'

While Japanese diplomatic authorities disclaimed all responsibility and said they were powerless to prevent smuggling on the coast of China, the military authorities said smuggling would be ended if China would adopt a different attitude towards Japan. There is humour or horror, according to the individual point of view, in a code of ethics so grotesque.

With smuggling made so easy for them, the smugglers grew bolder and evaded the payment of freight. Passenger trains from Tientsin to the south were filled with bundles



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of rayon or other valuable cargo, the property of the smugglers who bought third-class tickets but occupied all the seats on the train. On a good many occasions American, British and other foreign passengers were ejected from their seats in order to provide room for the freight.

During the height of this officially-protected smuggling the Japanese made another approach to the Chinese government, suggesting that Japan and China should co-operate in driving the Communist army from North China. The National government showed no enthusiasm for this scheme. The Red Army had already been driven out of South-eastern and Western China and was now in the North-west, so far removed from Nanking that it did not constitute a menace. Certainly the National government would rather have this territory occupied by Chinese Communists than by Japanese soldiers.

Japanese propagandists promptly interpreted this point of view as proving that the National government was communistic at heart and was probably conniving with the Soviet for an attack on Japan.

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In spite of the loss of revenue which smuggling brought about and the general disruption of the governmental machinery in North China, the progress of the National government continued. On October 10, 1936, there was a general celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the outbreak of the revolution which led to the overthrow of the Manchus. While in North China, where Japanese influence was preponderant, the day was allowed to pass unnoticed, in other parts of the country there were spontaneous celebrations and thousands of flags were displayed – which could leave no doubt in the mind of anyone that Chinese patriotism had at last found itself and that it was a force to be reckoned with. The day of the war lord and of sectional and provincial differences was not gone, but was rapidly passing.

Before 1911 China looked backwards, regarded her past glories, and was complacent, lazy, and slovenly. For almost two decades she had been stumbling aimlessly about. Now she was definitely facing forwards, had

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a clear-cut programme of progress, and was unmistakably on her way.

In December of 1936 there occurred that strange and unexplained incident, the kidnapping at Sianfu of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek by 'Young Marshal' Chang Hsueh-Liang. For several days the Chinese people did not know whether their leader was alive or dead, and when it was learned that he was alive but a captive, an anxious fortnight was to pass before his safety was assured.

This was during the Christmas and New Year holiday season and my wife and I were spending ten days on a house-boat anchored near the beautiful Nine Arch Bridge near Mutu. One night we were awakened by the sound of millions of firecrackers being exploded in Soochow, four miles away. It was about midnight, an hour at which all of China can usually be depended upon to be in bed and long asleep. Consequently we were puzzled until a countryman who was out late on some errand came by and shouted to our servants that the Generalissimo had been released and was then safe on his way

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to Nanking. Throughout the Yangtsze Valley there were celebrations that night similar to the one we heard. Their importance and the quality of the joy to which they gave expression can only be appreciated by those who know the Chinese predilection for going to bed early and staying there until dawn.

The Chinese have a flair for the dramatic and an old-fashioned faith in the triumph of right over might. The threat to their leader and his eventual escape from danger appealed to them as being one of those providential happenings by which the forces of evil are thwarted and virtue allowed to triumph. There followed the publication of the diary which he had kept during the period of his captivity. It was the simple, soldierly narrative of an honest man which convinced his bitterest enemies of his patriotism, unselfishness, and sincerity of purpose. After a quarter of a century of search which had often appeared futile and hopeless, China had at last found a leader she could trust and follow.

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This was a development which the Japanese militarists had feared but had not foreseen. Their programme in China depended on disunity, on their ability to lop off some portion of Chinese territory without arousing the serious resentment of other parts of the country. It has been said, and probably with some truth, that during the war between China and Japan, Japanese warships called at Canton and received a friendly welcome. The Cantonese could see no reason for hostility towards a nation which was fighting the Northern Chinese but leaving the Cantonese in peace. It had been by taking advantage of these sectional differences that Japan had been able to encroach on China so successfully. With China united under one leader this would no longer be possible.

Even the reactionary war lords who had held aloof from Chiang Kai-Shek would now be compelled by public opinion to ally themselves with him. There could be no doubt about it: China was rapidly building up her defensive military machine. Although munitions and other war material imported for the Chinese government were not listed on

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the customs returns, the Japanese secret service knew that for several years no less than one-fifth of China's total imports fell under that category. They knew that millions of gallons of aviation gasoline and millions of dollars' worth of munitions had been stored in that vast natural fortress, the province of Szechuen. It did not require the technical knowledge of a trained military observer to see that the old undisciplined rabble which had constituted the Chinese armies had disappeared and that the modern Chinese soldier was as well equipped and apparently as well trained and disciplined as any soldier in the world.

It was obvious that the longer the conquest of North China was delayed the more difficult and costly it would be. Just when the Japanese war lords decided on early action is known only to themselves, but it was probably in the early part of 1937 – and they waited only for a suitable opportunity.

This soon presented itself in the European crisis, which developed as a result of the interference of outsiders in the Spanish revolution, and the mysterious submarine attacks

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in the Mediterranean. With a war in Europe so imminent and with most of the European statesmen at loggerheads over troubles which threatened at their own doorsteps, a Japanese invasion into North China was sure to attract a minimum of attention and interest. So they hoped a brief coup would be successful; they might have the thing over with and some kind of semi-legal rights established in North China before the European nations realised what was going on. As for America, they relied on the peace-at-any-price Americans who virtuously side-step present problems for future generations to settle.

There remained only Russia to consider, and danger did not appear to threaten from this quarter. According to newspaper reports, which were doubtless confirmed and supplemented by highly efficient Japanese secret service, a widespread network of espionage and sabotage had been uncovered in Siberia, and Soviet Russia was going through another of her bloody purges in which a number of high military officials were convicted of treason and shot. These

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trials and executions indicated quite conclusively that there existed among the military forces in Siberia a lack of unity which would make opposition to Japan's plans highly improbable – if Japan acted quickly. To test the matter Japan created a number of incidents on the Manchukuo-Soviet border and the failure of the Russians to reply with their usual vigour convinced the Japanese that they might proceed with their North China venture.

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On the night of July 7 Japanese troops engaged in night manoeuvres near the famous Marco Polo Bridge, a few miles from Peiping. In the middle of the night the local citizens were awakened by the marching of troops. According to Japanese reports, which no one was ever given an opportunity of verifying, a revolver shot was heard from the walled town, and on roll call it was found that one soldier was missing.

It was this comparatively trivial incident which set Japan's war machine in operation, with results which have horrified the world.

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In the course of their encroachments on China, extending over a long period of years, Japanese statesmen, diplomats, generals, admirals, foreign apologists, and propagandists have from time to time issued a great many statements explaining and justifying their actions. A comparison of these statements will reveal numerous curious contrasts and contradictions – for a half-dozen reasons and justifications will be given for the same action or policy – but through them all there runs a strain of consistency and sincerity which even the most sceptical must recognise.

The Japanese are sincere in their aims. They sincerely believe that they have a mission to perform on this earth, which is the remodelling of the world's civilisation along superior Japanese lines. They believe that they are fully justified in such violent action as may be necessary in order to destroy the existing civilisation of China and replace it with Japanese culture. It was neither by accident nor as a part of their military programme of frightfulness that the Japanese destroyed so many of the universities and publishing-houses of China, but a deliberate

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attempt to wipe out Chinese culture so as to make it easier to establish the Japanese brand.

This attitude of mind presupposes a fanatical belief in the superiority of the Japanese peoples over all others, and they actually do believe in that superiority. To those who have been accustomed to look upon them as a very clever but curious little people, this concept appears impertinent to the point of absurdity. But the Japanese have a good deal of justification for that high appraisal of themselves. Look, for a moment, at the overseas and domestic progress they have made. Less than a century ago Japan was a country completely isolated from the rest of the world, knowing nothing of modern science, industrial or business organisation. No other civilised country had been less affected by modern progress. Within the lifetime of some living Japanese such marvellous progress has been made that the Japanese themselves can account for it only by the miraculous influence of the emperor, who, it must be remembered, is a divinity.

The strength of its army and its navy, both

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constructed in their entirety during this period, has made Japan one of the great powers of the world. Starting with nothing more than a hazy idea of what a steamship looked like, the Japanese have built up a mercantile marine which covers the world with a network of lines, providing both freight and passenger services unexcelled by any other nation. By producing cheaper goods, especially cotton textiles, they have terrorised manufacturers of other countries who are helpless against such competition. In their social organisation they also have good reason to assume their own superiority. American rackets and gang murders would be impossible in Japan, as would the labour upheavals of England. Furthermore, they can justify their consciousness of superiority by the fact that Japan has led the world in the manufacture and sale of narcotics, but the Japanese themselves have never become addicts.

As a result of all this the Japanese believe that they are the chosen people, that the world would be a better place if it were a world ruled by Japan. Let there be no mistake about it. Fantastical as this idea may

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sound, it is the dream which inspires the Japanese militarists and moves them to such superhuman efforts and sacrifices.

The conquest of China constitutes a very important chapter in the programme. With Chinese resources developed by Japan and Chinese man power augmenting the armies of Japan, she would create an Oriental power greater than any present combination of Western powers, and would be in reasonable distance of her goal of world domination.

According to her oft-repeated statements, Japan's conquests have always been in self-defence, and from her point of view this is truthful. Korea was conquered and made a part of the empire of Japan because of the fear that if this were not done some other power would seize the helpless country and thus menace Japan. Korea and Manchuria were neighbours with a long boundary line and so Manchuria was conquered because, among other reasons, its close proximity constituted a menace to Korea. Jehol was taken as a safeguard to Manchuria and encroachments were made on Inner Mongolia for the same reason. Chinese troops in North China

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threatened these new possessions, therefore a war of self-defence is necessary in order to bring North China under Japanese control and remove this menace.

This line of reasoning, if followed further, as the Japanese have obviously followed it, leads to some very interesting conclusions. There can be no doubt but that, if Japan does not take possession of North China, the presence of Chinese troops in the Yangtsze Valley will make it necessary to fight another war of self-defence, for Chinese troops will menace their position north of the Yellow River. Having conquered the Yangtsze Valley, still another war will be necessary in South China.

Suppose that Japan wins this war of conquest. She will then have possession of all of China, but will she be secure? That she will be is not a reasonable assumption, for her southern outposts would be seriously menaced by the heavily fortified British Colony of Hong-Kong. From here the British could at any time dispossess her of the rich and populous city of Canton and control the trade and shipping of South China. By the time she was confronted with

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this problem Japan, in possession of China, would control about one-third of the population of the world.

Hong-Kong could not be securely held without possession of Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines – and so, if we follow the Japanese justification for conquest and expansion, we find ourselves in a series of vicious consequences to which there can be no logical end.

After China, what?





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